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The notion of information processing has dominated the study of the mind for over
six decades. However, before the advent of cognitivism, one of the most prominent
theoretical ideas was that of Habit. This is a concept with a rich and complex history,
which is again starting to awaken interest, following recent embodied, enactive critiques
of computationalist frameworks. We offer here a very brief history of the concept of habit
in the form of a genealogical network-map. This serves to provide an overview of the
richness of this notion and as a guide for further re-appraisal. We identify 77 thinkers
and their influences, and group them into seven schools of thought. Two major trends
can be distinguished. One is the associationist trend, starting with the work of Locke
and Hume, developed by Hartley, Bain, and Mill to be later absorbed into behaviorism
through pioneering animal psychologists (Morgan and Thorndike). This tradition conceived
of habits atomistically and as automatisms (a conception later debunked by cognitivism).
Another historical trend we have called organicism inherits the legacy of Aristotle and
develops along German idealism, French spiritualism, pragmatism, and phenomenology.
It feeds into the work of continental psychologists in the early 20th century, influencing
important figures such as Merleau-Ponty, Piaget, and Gibson. But it has not yet been
taken up by mainstream cognitive neuroscience and psychology. Habits, in this tradition,
are seen as ecological, self-organizing structures that relate to a web of predispositions
and plastic dependencies both in the agent and in the environment. In addition, they are
not conceptualized in opposition to rational, volitional processes, but as transversing a
continuum from reflective to embodied intentionality. These are properties that make
habit a particularly attractive idea for embodied, enactive perspectives, which can now
re-evaluate it in light of dynamical systems theory and complexity research.
Keywords: habit, associationism, organicism, history of psychology, history of philosophy
INTRODUCTION
For over 60 years the most basic theoretical concept in psychol-
ogy, neuroscience, and cognitive science has been the processing
of information and the associated notion of “mental representa-
tion.” Neuroscientists search for modules and regions that pro-
cess, store, retrieve or integrate information that is encoded or
represented in the brain. But this hasn’t always been the case.
Before the advent of cognitivism in the 1950s one of the most
prominent concepts for the study of mind was that of Habit.
Despite constituting only very coarse evidence, the sub-plot in
Figure 1 (top-left) shows trends in the use of the words “habit”
and “representation” since 1850. It is noteworthy that for most
of the second half of the 20th century mentions of “habit”
decrease and those of “representation” increase in a sustained
manner. The anti-correlation is maintained with the reversal of
these tendencies at the start of the 21st century, roughly indi-
cating that habit is again becoming a notion of interest. This
is no coincidence. Current embodied dissatisfactions with the
information-processing framework (Varela et al., 1991; Kelso,
1995; Van Gelder, 1998; Thompson, 2007; Chemero, 2009; Di
Paolo et al., 2010; Hutto and Myin, 2013) call for a reappraisal
of this notion. The task, one quickly finds, is huge. The richness
and polysemy of the notion of habit and its transformations since
ancient Greece to the present day, all militate against the naïve
idea of producing an off-the-shelf alternative theoretical primitive
for psychology and neuroscience.
In this mini-review we offer a brief genealogy of the concept of
habit in the form of a network-map. We place those thinkers who
have worked on this concept in a historical relation. Our objec-
tive is to outline the genealogy of the notion of habit and identify
major trends and schools of thought that have had an impact on
current neuroscientific conceptions of habit and those that have
not but still deserve attention.
As in the case with real maps, there is potentially no end to
the amount of detail that may be included. The more detailed
the map, the better the chances for efficient local navigation,
but often at the price of losing the big picture. We have chosen
to draw only the big picture (Figure 1). For this reason, links
represent a general notion of “influence” between two thinkers,
without going into relevant details such as, e.g., whether the
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influence has been positive or critical, whether it is manifested as
an explicit conceptual debt or as more subtle forms of inspiration,
or indeed whether the same thinker’s notion of habit has evolved
significantly at different stages and under different influences.
It is likely that no two links in our map depict the exact same
kind of influence. But a link describes at least an acknowledged or
clearly recognized impact, which in most cases will be manifested
as a direct reference to the influencing thinker in the works listed
on Table 1. As a general rule transitive influences have not been
drawn on the map and antagonistic links are also left out unless
the critique of a previous conception of habit leads to a richer
conception that integrates the view of the criticized author.
We have taken the general rule that all authors presented on
the map should have discussed habits explicitly. But there are a
few exceptions to this rule. For instance, Kant did not elaborate
a strong positive contribution to the notion of habit—in fact,
he is accountable for the ensuing divide between habit and rea-
son in ethics—yet, his insights into the nature of teleology and
self-organization strongly influenced the notion of habit, plastic-
ity and holistic interdependence in various thinkers. Others do
not make direct use of the term habit, but use parallel notions
that were later (or previously) conceptualized as habits (such
as von Uexküll’s “functional cycles” or Pavlov’s “reflexes”). The
map still leaves out a considerable amount of literature on habit
or habit-related research, e.g., work in economics, anthropology,
psychoanalysis and research on habituation and addiction.
The timeline reaches up to the 1980s with some addi-
tional references to later work in the cognitivist and connec-
tionist traditions added for completeness (Elman, Rumelhart,
and McClelland, Arbib, Fodor, etc.). It is worth noting that a
few authors appear (almost) without connections (von Holst,
Bernstein, Ryle), yet their contributions are nowadays considered
important. Gestalt psychologists, who together exert a notable
influence on the habit concept without addressing it directly in
their work, appear without a reference in Table 1.
The reader might still be left with a fundamental question
regarding the key contribution of this map: What is the value
of this genealogy for contemporary neuroscience? Whereas much
work in human neuroscience appears informed by a rich philo-
sophical, psychological and theoretical tradition (e.g., the neu-
roscience of perception, emotion or consciousness, cognitive or
large-scale neuroscience), we believe that neuroscientific research
on habit remains rooted within a narrow theoretical tradition.
For instance, in an otherwise excellent review of recent work,
Graybiel (2008) makes only a sparse reference to William James.
Similarly, Wood and Neal (2007) only mention Thorndike and
Skinner as conceptual precursors. This is understandable, as the
history of habit is indeed complex and relatively unexplored. Our
inherited conception appears historically distorted—only a few
recent studies examine the genealogy of the concept (see Pollard,
2008; Carlisle and Sinclair, 2011; Carlisle, 2014). The map we
present is an attempt to fill in this gap, providing a birds-eye view
that can be used to navigate the history of the concept.
TRACING THE GENEALOGIES OF HABIT
Let us attempt a broad reading of the map. We identify two
major historical trends, associationism and organicism, taking
Table 1 | List of authors and their most significant work related to
habits. The year corresponds to the original publication and the title
to the English translation (if available).
Year Author Work
−350 Aristotle Nichomachean ethics, Metaphysics,
De anima, De memoria and,
Categories
∼1150/1671 Ibn Tufail Philosophus autodidactus [Risala Hayy
ibn Yaqzan fi asrar al-hikmat
al-mashriqiyya]
1274 T. Aquinas Summa theologica (Treatise on habit
QQ49-54)
1649, 1664 R. Descartes The passions of the soul and Treatise
of man
1655 T. Hobbes De corpore
1677 B. Spinoza Ethics
1687, 1704 I. Newton Philosophiae naturalis Principia
mathematica and Opticks
1690 J. Locke An essay concerning human
understanding
1739, 1748 D. Hume A treatise of human nature and
Enquiry concerning human
understanding
1740 J. Butler The analogy of religion, natural and
revealed, to the constitution and
course of nature
1749 D. Hartley Observations on man, his frame, his
duty, and his expectations
1754 E. B. de Condillac Treatise on the sensations
1762 J-J Rousseau Émile or On education
1788 T. Reid Essays on the active powers of the
human mind
1790 E. Kant Critique of judgment
1799 F. W. J. Schelling First outline for a system of a
philosophy of nature
1800 X. Bichat Recherches physiologiques sur la vie
et la mort
1803 M. de Biran Influence de l’habitude sur la faculté
de penser
1809 J. B. P. Lamarck Zoological philosophy
1820 J. W. Goethe Outline for a general introduction
comparative anatomy, Commencing
osteology
1830 G. W. F. Hegel The philosophy of mind (Part 3 of the
Encyclopaedia of the philosophical
sciences)
1838 F. Ravaisson Of habit
1855, 1859 A. Bain Senses and the intellect, The
emotions and the will
1869 J. Mill Analysis of the phenomena of the
human mind
1874 W. B. Carpenter Principles of mental physiology
1874 F. C. Brentano Psychology from an empirical
standpoint
1876 L. Dumont De l’habitude (Rev. Phil de la France et
de l’Etranger)
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Year Author Work
1877, 1878 C. S. Peirce The fixation of belief, How to make
ideas clear (see also Collected Papers)
1878 S. Butler Life and habit
1889 P. Janet L’Automatisme psychologique
1890 C. von Ehrenfels Über Gestaltqualitäten
1890 W. James Principles of psychology (Ch. 4 Habit)
1896 J. M. Baldwin Mental development in the child and
the race: Methods and processes
1896 C. L. Morgan Habit and instinct
1896 H. Bergson Matter and memory
1905, 1911 E. Thorndike Elements of psychology, Animal
intelligence: Experimental studies
1906 H. S. Jennings Behavior of the lower organisms
1909 J. von Uexküll Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere
1912 E. Husserl Ideas: General introduction to pure
phenomenology (Part II)
1913 J. B. Watson Psychology as the behaviorist views it
1920 F. J. J. Buytendijk Psychologie der dieren
1922, 1929 J. Dewey Human nature and conduct,
Experience and Nature
1927 M. Heidegger Being and time
1927 I. P. Pavlov Conditioned reflexes
1928 W. McDougall Body and mind; A history and a
defence of animism
1929 J. Chevallier L’habitude: essai de métaphysique
scientifique
1930, 1934 C. L. Hull Knowledge and purpose as habit
mechanisms, The concept of the
habit-family hierarchy and maze
learning
1933 E. Claparède La Genèse de l’hypothèse: étude
expérimentale
1934 M. Mauss Techniques of the body
1934 K. Goldstein The organism
1935 E. von Holst Relative coordination as a
phenomenon and as a method of
analysis of central nervous system
function
1935 E. R. Guthrie The psychology of learning
1936 P. Guillaume La formation des habitudes
1937, 1955 G. Allport The functional autonomy of motives,
Becoming
1938 B. F. Skinner The behavior of organisms: An
experimental analysis
1942, 1945 M. Merleau-Ponty The structure of behavior,
Phenomenology of perception
1947, 1969 J. Piaget The psychology of intelligence,
Biology and knowledge
1947/1967 N. Bernstein The co-ordination and regulation of
movements see also Dexterity and its
development (1996)
1948 E. C. Tolman Cognitive maps in rats and men
1949 G. Ryle The concept of mind
1949 D. Hebb Organization of behavior
(Continued)
Table 1 | Continued
Year Author Work
1950 P. Ricoeur Freedom and nature: The voluntary
and the involuntary
1951 K. Lorenz & N.
Timbergeen
The study of instinct
1951 I. Kohler The formation and transformation of
the perceptual world (1964)
1952 W. R. Ashby Design for a brain
1953, 1968 G. Deleuze Difference and repetition, Empiricism
and subjectivity
1957 F. Rosenblatt The perceptron: A probabilistic model
for information storage and
organization in the brain
1959 N. Chomsky A review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal
behavior
1962 J. G. Taylor The behavioral basis of perception
1969 M. L. Minsky & S.
Papert
Perceptrons: An introduction to
computational geometry
1972 P. Bourdieu Outline of a theory of practice (1977)
1979 J. J. Gibson The ecological approach to visual
perception
1983 J. Fodor The modularity of mind: an essay on
faculty psychology
1986 M. A. Arbib and M.
B. Hesse
The construction of reality
1986 D. E. Rumelhart, J.
L. McClelland and
PDP Group
Parallel distributed processing, Vol. 1:
Foundations
1988 J. Fodor and Z. W.
Pylyshyn
Connectionism and cognitive
architecture: A critical analysis
1996 J. L. Elman et al. Rethinking innateness: A
connectionist perspective on
development
their names from themost salient school of thought in each trend.
But we shall first start from the Greek and Aristotelian polysemic
conception of habit.
The Latin term habitus, from which the English habit comes,
can be traced back to two Greek words: ethos ( θoς), and hexis
( ξις). The etymology of ethos, from which the English term
ethics derives, is particularly revealing because it contains a pro-
found duality. It means both “an accustomed place” in which
human and animals live or in-habit (a “habitat”) and “a dispo-
sition or character” denoting the personality that develops along
a person’s lifetime. According to Aristotle, the term hexis (having
or being in possession of something) is a relational and active
category: “a kind of activity of the haver and of what he has—
something like an action or movement” [Met. 5.1022b]1, it is also
a normative dispositional category “‘Having’ or ‘habit’ means a
disposition according to which that which is disposed is either
well or ill disposed” [Met. 5.1022b]. The ethical implications
of this conception of habit extend to a self-modifying practice,
1References given between square brackets correspond to works used in
constructing the map. They are listed in Table 1.
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exercised so as to attain a virtuous character wherein spontaneity,
joy, and norms converge.
We can interpret the Aristotelian conception of habit as an
arrangement of behavioral mediations between subject and object
(or between a subject and herself—in the future or past) that is
well or ill-disposed in relation to essence or form and the “imme-
diate substrate in which it is naturally produced.” Habit arises
from custom or repetition in a manner that constitutes a sort of
second nature for the subject. In this sense, Aristotle can be said
to be one of the early precursors of the organicist trend in the con-
ception of habit. But he is also credited for inspiring the central
claim of associationism (Buckingham and Finger, 1997).
THE ASSOCIATIONIST TREND
Associationism can be summarized as the view that mental phe-
nomena are formed by combination or association of simple
elements. This association follows the principle that the occur-
rence of event B given event A will be favored if B has repeatedly
followed A in the past (often, the strength of A or B, their sim-
ilarity, space-time contiguity, etc. are taken as strengthening this
association). A and B are generally considered as mental states
or ideas arising from sensations (often interpreted in terms of
nervous activation).
The work of Ibn Tufail (12th century), translated into Latin
as Philosophus Autodidactus [1671], tells the story of a child that
reconstructs a full philosophical and theological system without
the help of a social or cultural environment. It influenced the
first associationists, particularly John Locke whose notion of tab-
ula rasa was almost directly taken from Ibn Tufail (Russell, 1994).
Locke’s empiricist principle—that sense data had to fill in a blank
slate—provided the basis of what was to come although he didn’t
provide a detailed account of associationism2.
It was David Hume [1748] who proposed the notion of
“habit,” “custom,” or “association” as the fundamental mecha-
nism for the development of psychological and epistemological
complexes. Atomized ideas are the direct result of sensations,
while the law of habit becomes the general principle of mental
organization by linking these ideas. Newton’s influence on this
conception of habit is apparent. Although the principles estab-
lished by Hume are not fundamentally modified by Hartley’s
work, the latter was capable of extending them to many psy-
chological phenomena (from memory to language, psychological
development and emotions). Perhaps one of the most salient
contributions was Hartley’s account of habits as arising from
“corporeal matter,” completing Hume’s philosophical approach
with an influential neuro-physiological theory of associations
based on the operations of the brain and the spinal cord, in accor-
dance with the “doctrine of vibrations” previously suggested by
Newton (Glassman and Buckingham, 2007). Further contributors
to the associationist school (Bain, Mill, Carpenter, etc.) conserved
most of the principles and theoretical assumptions of Hume and
Hartley until a scientific formulation of some of these principles
by behaviorist precursors came from the scientific study of animal
behavior (Morgan, Thorndike and Pavlov).
2Except for chapter 33 in his Essay introduced only in the 4th edition and
dealing mostly with the origin of confusion and mistaken ideas.
The subsequent development of the notion of habit was sub-
ordinated to the available methods of measurement and interven-
tion, which aimed at the “prediction and control of behavior”
[Watson, 1913: 158]. The contribution of behaviorism to this
trend can be summarized in twomain aspects that result from the
epistemological constraints of logical positivism (Smith, 1986)
on the notion of habit: (a) the progressive externalization of the
units of association in terms of stimulus and response (remov-
ing any reference to intermediate neurological or psychological
processes) and (b) the mathematical treatment of the relationship
between external operators and observables (stimulus, response,
reinforcers) in terms of conditional probabilities. Skinner even
rejected learning theories (Skinner, 1950) and purified the avail-
able terminology dropping the notion of habit altogether in favor
of “rate of conditioned response.”
At this point, together with the advent of computational and
information theory, the ground was prepared for the now much
impoverished notion of habit to disappear altogether from the
set of theoretical primitives in psychology and neuroscience.
Through experimental [Tolman, 1948] and theoretical [Chomsky,
1959; Fodor, 1983] arguments against behaviorism, habit was
soon replaced by “mental representation” and the notion of “asso-
ciation” was substituted by that of “computation.” Some of the
associationist (and also organicist) principles were revived in
neuroscience [Hebb, 1949] and, particularly, in connectionism
[Rosenblatt, 1957; Rumerhart and McClelland, 1987] only to be
fiercely attacked again by cognitivists [Minsky and Papert, 1969;
Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988]3. The result of this development is
the current convergence of machine learning and reinforcement
learning with neuroscience (see Sutton and Barto, 1998; Daw
et al., 2005; Dezfouli et al., 2012) where habits have been sub-
sumed under networks of conditional probabilities of expected
rewards associated with a set of available actions under specific
conditions, or simply reduced to stimulus-triggered responses
reinforced only by repetition (Dickinson, 1985). Associationist
principles still exert an influence in neuroscience under the form
of Hebbian learning and activity-dependent plasticity (Abbott
and Nelson, 2000).
THE ORGANICIST TREND
Somewhat parallel to the development of the associationist trend
we encounter an organicist tradition (left of Figure 1). Habits in
this tradition are examined along what we would call today more
ecological, self-organizing lines. Habits are both cause and effect
of their own enactment and therefore constitute their own prin-
ciple of individuation (Toscano, 2006), as opposed to being the
passive result of the recurrence of an otherwise pre-established set
of entities (ideas, stimulus, rewards, etc.). For organicism, habits
are also related to a plastic equilibrium that involves the totality
of the organism, including other habits, the body and the habitat
they co-determine.
Spinoza’s notion of conatus, as the striving for perseverance
that defines the essence of organisms, prefigured the internal-
ist and naturalistic conception of individuality and teleology
3For a detailed account of these developments and intellectual battles, see
Margaret Boden’s monumental history of cognitive science (Boden, 2006).
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that characterizes organicism. Kant [1790] provided a regulative
notion of teleology in terms of the intertwinement of means and
ends in the self-organized nature of organic life, thereby insinu-
ating a way out of the tight mechanistic framework established
by Descartes and Newton. Hegel [1830], in deep dialog with the
Aristotelian tradition, emphasized the plasticity of habit as the
mediating term in the resolution of the mind’s contradictory ten-
dencies toward world-independence and self-determination on
the one hand, and over-stimulation and world-determination,
on the other. By becoming second nature, habit prevents the
mind from falling into either extreme that would lead to insan-
ity. Goethe (though not directly addressing the notion of habit)
deeply influenced subsequent conceptions of organic life by coin-
ing the term “morphology” and proposing the law of compensa-
tion to refer to the plastic change of natural forms in accordance
with inner forces that respect the balance of the totality [1820].
Ravaisson’s De l’habitude [1838] constitutes a cornerstone within
this trend. Ravaisson puts habits at the center of metaphysics,
extending from vegetative life to deliberative thought, defin-
ing habits as dynamical processes that transverse a continuum
between reflective/self-aware and pre-reflective/embodied forms
of intentionality (Sinclair, 2011).
Further development of the habit notion within the organicist
school made it possible to expand on the dialectics between the
inner tendencies of organic individuality and its co-development
with the environment. von Uexküll [1909] used the term Umwelt
to designate the habitat of the organism, that is, the carving of
a world (from an undifferentiated environment) through func-
tional sensorimotor cycles. His work was part of an organicist
revival in Central Europe during the first half of the 20th cen-
tury (Grene, 1965; Harrington, 1996), with notable exponents
like the phenomenologically-informed psychologist/ethologist F.
J. J. Buytendijk and neurologist Kurt Goldstein, whose studies of
abstract vs. concrete behaviors in patients with brain lesions led
him to holistic notions of the organism as seeking the equilibrium
of preferred behaviors.
Somewhat intertwined within the organicist school, phe-
nomenology and Gestalt psychology enriched this tradition in
various ways. Husserl, for instance, acknowledged that habit is
“intimately involved in the constitution of meaningfulness” at all
levels, from perception to society (Moran, 2011). Merleau-Ponty
[1945] drew inspiration from Paul Guillaume’s Gestalt approach
and Goldstein’s experiments to develop a notion of habits as
incorporated styles of being-in-the-world, thus revealing their
inherent corporeal intentionality in contrast to notions of habits
as blind automatisms. Gestalt psychology provided a systematic
and experimental basis for holistic phenomena in perception,
displacing atomistic metaphors in psychology in favor of fields
and systems theory. Of particular significance are the experiments
with vision distorting goggles by Ivo Kohler [1962] who empha-
sized the importance of action for perception, combining an
active notion of habit with Gestalt principles.
Overall, the exponents of the organicist tradition in the 20th
century pronounced themselves explicitly against atomistic ten-
dencies, such as the localization of brain function and theories of
reflex conditioning. The trend also influenced pragmatist thinkers
such as James [1890], and particularly Dewey [1922], who also
saw habits as communicating wholes affecting each other and as
the substrate of self-transforming human nature. He resisted the
reductionist implications of the reflex-arc concept by highlighting
the active role of the organism in the selection of stimuli.
Organicism, whose ramifications appear less unified and
cumulative than the associationist line, has influenced a vari-
ety of positions ranging from the integrative work of Piaget (his
treatment of habit marks the starting point for a dynamic concep-
tion of cognitive development) to ecological psychology [Gibson,
1979], and the sociological conception of habitus as structured
and structuring practices [Mauss, 1934; Bourdieu, 1972].
Current sensitivity to the organicist trend is manifest in large-
scale neuroscience (Edelman and Tononi, 2001; Freeman, 2001;
Llinas, 2001), constructivist developmental neuroscience (Quartz
and Sejnowski, 1997; Johnson, 2001), embodied-enactive cog-
nitive science (Varela et al., 1991; Thompson, 2007; Di Paolo
et al., 2010), robotics (Di Paolo, 2003; Egbert and Barandiaran,
under review), sensorimotor approaches to cognition (O’Regan
and Noë, 2001; Noë, 2004) and cognitive neuroscience (Engel
et al., 2013). In most cases the concept of habit forged by the
organicist tradition has been modified to avoid the critiques
against behaviorism, and its legacy appears to be masked under
related notions such as skill, sensorimotor organization, neuro-
plasticity, etc.
CONCLUSIONS
We have provided a map and a very broad survey of the vari-
ous ways in which the concept of habit has evolved from ancient
Greece to the late 1980s, identifying two major traditions. The
associationist trend conceives of habits atomistically as units that
result from the association of ideas or between stimulus and
response. The organicist trend, in contrast, sees habits as dynam-
ically configured stable patterns, strengthened and individualized
by their enactment. Associationism provides a statistical or com-
binatorial relationship between the components of a habit (based
on time lapses between events, their similarity, etc.). Organicism,
in contrast, proposes a more holistic view, wherein embodied
relational constraints and plastic interdependencies determine
the formation andmaintenance of habits. Finally, the association-
ist trend keeps habit within the realm of reactive sub-personal
automatisms (in opposition to the intentional, rational, and per-
sonal levels of cognitive processing). For organicism, in contrast,
habits transition between nature and will, forming an integral
part of individual embodied intentionality; they are the systemic
conditions of the possibility of experience—their significance
becomes clearly manifested when habits are disturbed yet they
remain continuously present, configuring the identity and world
of the cognitive subject.
Unlike many notions in organicism, associationist ideas were
ready-made for translation into scientific hypotheses during the
20th century, even if it was ironically the subsequent develop-
ment of such formalisms that fueled the cognitivist rejection of
the notion of habit. While neuroscience has been partially influ-
enced by this rejection, related ideas have survived, particularly
in theories of neuroplasticity and Hebbian learning. These habit-
like notions are generally associationist in character, but they
have also given rise to theories of neural assemblies and neural
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self-organization (Varela, 1995; Freeman, 2001), which are more
organicist-friendly. Similarly, in other areas of cognitive science,
dynamical systems formalisms, modeling and experimental tech-
niques now provide the necessary tools for investigating more
organicist conceptions of habit.
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